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Motivation
Grand Challenge for ablative material modeling: 
§ TPS certification for high reliability  
ØNeed to 
• Understand failure modes and failure propagation,
• Assess features that lead may become flaws and then on to 
failure
• Design - eliminate features that lead to failure and add that lead 
to robustness 
• Guide strategies for robust margin development, 
• Enable reliability prediction and 
• Provide evidence supporting certification of as built hardware
§ NOT development of new material systems
• May tailor available TPS architectures, particularly 3D woven 
concepts
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Outline 
§ Mars Sample Return Mission
§ State of the Art
Ø MSR Earth Entry Vehicle
Ø TPS Reliability
Ø TPS Modeling
§ What is Needed
ØSystem Studies
Ø TPS Capability Characterization
§ Concluding Remarks 
8/30/17 3
30
Mars Sample Return
as discussed in Visions &Voyages 2011 Decadal Survey
Mars Sample Return Lander
Orbiting Sample in
Mars Orbit
Retrieve/Package
Samples on Mars
Launch Samples
to Mars Orbit
Mars Sample Return Orbiter
Orbiting Sample on
Earth
Capture and Isolate
Sample Container
Return to
Earth
Land on
Earth
Sample Handling Facility
Sample Science
Retrieve/Quarantine
and Preserve Samples 
on Earth
Assess Hazards Sample Science
Sample Caching Rover Sample Canisters On
Mars Surface
Launch from
Earth/Land on
Mars
Select Samples Acquire/Cache
Samples
*
30
“Highest-priority flagship mission”
“Important to make significant technology investments”
Background on Planetary Protection 
Requirements and the Grand Challenge
§ NASA Policy Directive 8020.7G requires compliance with 1967 UN Treaty on Outer 
Space Article IX, which states:
Ø NASA Procedural Requirement 8020.12 (Planetary Protection Provisions for Robotic 
Extraterrestrial Missions) is derived from Committee on Space Research (COSPAR) 
Planetary Protection Policy
Ø Sample return from Mars and other water worlds: Category V “Restricted Earth 
Return”  Highest degree of concern is expressed by the “Absolute prohibition of 
destructive impact upon return, the need for containment throughout the return 
phase ….” 
Ø Both ESA and NASA have defined design guidelines for mission studies in the recent 
past: 
• JPL D-31974: “probability that sample containment not assured (CNA) < 1 e-6
• Planetary Protection for Mars Sample Return (Conley, Kminek, 2011) “Guidance: 
Probability of uncontained release of particle larger than 10 nanometers into Earth 
environment < 1e-6
§ Reliability allocation to subsystems is function of mission architecture
• EEV failure during correctly targeted entry < 4.0x10-7 (Gershman, 2005)
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EEV (and TPS) need to be extremely robust against 
all possible failure modes
Features,  Flaws and Failure
§ Acreage
Ø Through Thickness cracks causing “heat leaks”
Ø In plane cracks causing reduced thickness
Ø Surface erosion 
• Mechanical failure causing spallation or accelerated layer loss
• Melt flow
Ø Flow through (permeability permits interior flow)
§ Loss of attachment of tiles or gap fillers, causing complete loss 
of thermal material over a large area
Ø Adhesive mechanical failure
• Substrate failure adjacent to adhesive
Ø Adhesive thermal failure
§ Cracking and opening of seams, permitting a “heat leak” in the 
gaps between tiles
Ø Adhesive mechanical failure
• Tile failure adjacent to adhesive
Ø Adhesive char and erosion
§ Material response prediction error
Ø Recession rate error
• Differential recession at seam
Ø Conduction
Structural Aero/Material
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State of the Art: MSR EEV Design
• MSR	EEV	Design	Baseline	(1998-2003)
• Assumption:	passive	is	reliable
• Self-righting,	mono-stable	entry	shape
• Chute-less	Design	=>	Direct	Impact
• TPS	:		Carbon-Phenolic	and		SLA	
• Micro-Meteorite	and	Orbital-Debris	Impact
• MMOD	impact	analysis	performed	in	2010	
showed	both	Carbon	Phenolic	and	SLA	are	
susceptible	to	failure	due	to	MMOD	impact.
• Reliability	requirement	on	heat-shield	and	
backshell
• Failure	allocation	to	entry	system	<	4.0x10-7
(Chop Molded at the nose and 
Tape Wrapped on the flank)
SLA
8/30/17 7
Orion	Post- PDR	 ISS Lunar
Requirement:	Loss	of	Crew 1/290 1/200
TPS	Allocation 1/5600 1/2100
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• Waiver required for EFT-1 test flight, due to negative structural margins against 
cracking of Avcoat ablator (Vander Kam, Gage) 
• PRA estimate for structural failure due to TPS bondline overtemperature ~1/160,000 (6.25e-6)
Orion Crew Vehicle Reliability allocations
From: (AIAA 2011-422) 
• Shuttle  Analysis of data from successful flights (did not include consideration of off-nominal 
TPS states) estimated TPS reliability  of 0.999999 ( or failure < 1.0x10-6)
– Columbia accident highlighted need for consideration of damage due to debris impact
• Robotic missions (No known mission failures due to TPS failure) (most not instrumented)
– Recession data for Galileo indicated near failure at shoulder
– MSL identified shear-induced failure mode for SLA during ground test campaign – switch to PICA
– Root cause of Mars DS2 failure unknown, but entry failure deemed unlikely
• Need comprehensive hazard analysis
• Assess likelihood and consequence for each hazard
• Need robust performance margins for all failure modes 
• Ground test to failure to establish performance limits
State of the Art: TPS Reliability
State of the Art: TPS Modeling
Reliable As Primary Design Input
§ 1D thermal sizing*
§ Multi-dimensional conduction*
Must be Augmented Via Test
§ Tiled systems / gap performance
§ Thermostructural performance
§ Margin assessment
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Must be Obtained Via Test
• Singularities (e.g. cut-outs, windows, 
closeouts, seals)
• Failure modes
• Off-nominal performance (damage)
• Reliability assessment
• Materials design
*once	models	have	been	calibrated	with	arc	jet	data	for	conditions	and	materials	of	relevance
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We know how to do (thermal) margin !
§ A TPS system is designed (margined) to a given reliability
Ø In other words, it must be robust to off-nominal conditions
Ø Thickness margin is typically applied as one reliability factor
§ Thickness margin is evaluated by evaluating uncertainties in 
environments and material performance and tracking their influence 
on design metrics of interest (e.g. bondline temperature)
Ø Goal is a full Monte-Carlo process, but we are not there yet
Ø Margin assessment is currently reliant on statistical performance data (AJ testing)
10MC	Analysis	of	thermal	margin Statistical	analysis	of	Arc	Jet	data
PICA:
52	samples
Mean	error	=	8%
3s Deviation	=	±26%
Inferred	Thermal	Margin	=	100°F
Avcoat:
21	samples
Mean	error	=	14%
3s Deviation	=	±25%
Inferred	Thermal	Margin	=	66°F
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State of The Art: Testing 
Design, Development, Flight Qualification / Certification
*Qualification sometimes combined with flight lot workmanship verification arc jet testing
Low(er) cost Mars Scout/Discovery/ 
New Frontiers Class
Flagship
Test Type Mars 
Pathfinder
Phoenix InSight Stardust 
SRC
O-Rex 
SRC
Mars 
Exploration 
Rovers
MSL M2020
Screening X X
Development/ 
Design Verification:
Ablative & Thermal Response 
Development/Verification
X X X X X X
Development/ 
Design Verification:
Design Features (gaps, repairs, 
defects, damage, etc)
X X X X X X
Development/ 
Design Verification:
Singularities (e.g. hardware 
penetrations and special features)
X X X X X
Qualification* X X X X X X X
Flight Lot Workmanship 
Verification
X X X X X X X X
Credit:	Szalai (JPL)
We	don’t	“	Test	as	we	Fly”	nor	we	“Fly	as	we	Test”	and	we	don’t	have	a	choice.
Testing	alone	is	insufficient	for	certification	of	high	reliability.
State of the Art: MMOD Risk to TPS
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“Micrometeoroid and Orbital Debris Threat Assessment: Mars Sample Return Earth Entry Vehicle,” 
E. Christiansen, J. L. Hyde, M.D. Bjorkman, K. D. Hoffman, et al. NASA TM 2013-217381, 2013
• Risk from Orbital Debris alone exceeds entire TPS allocation
• MMOD “garage” on spacecraft does not adequately address MMOD risk
• Dedicated MMOD shield carried to Entry Interface must separate 
reliably
Alternate	MMOD	protection
Need TPS material that is more robust to MMOD
Modeling of Material Flaws and Failure is Grand Challenge 
Needed: System Studies
§ Reliability requirements for MSR demand a new approach 
for campaign design
ØRisk-based design, accounting also for common cause/mode 
failures, drives redundancy and diversity of system design [1]
ØPerform studies with reliability as primary metric
• Allocation of functions to subsystems
• TPS role in MMOD protection and landing impact attenuation
• Dissimilar redundant capability
• TPS typically exempted from redundancy requirements: Design for Minimum Risk
• Re-visit creative options for secondary TPS
• Account for consequence of primary failure on secondary load environment
• Safety features
• Detect incipient failure
• Sacrifice some science return to assure planetary protection
8/30/17 14
[1] Conley, Catharine A., and Gerhard Kminek, "Planetary Protection for Mars Sample Return." ESA/NASA, April 29 (2013).
Needed: TPS Robust Against All Failure Modes
(3-D Woven TPS)
§ Manufacturing approach 
Ø 3-D weaving that allows precise 
placement of fibers and  resin infusion
§ Applications:  
Ø 3-D MAT – Multi-functional material for 
Orion Compression Pad
ØHeat-shield for Extreme Entry 
Environment Technology (HEEET) 
• HEEET addresses both material and 
system
• Dual layer for performance and robustness
• Seams required
• Tech maturation (FY’14 – FY’18)
• Targeted towards extreme entry missions
§ Can 3-D woven TPS provide a robust 
solution to MSR EEV? 
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Recession Resistant Layer
Lower Density 
Insulating Layer
Bonded Structure
Needed: Characterization of Aerothermal Capability
No ground test facility is fully capable of combined thermo-structural 
testing at extreme entry conditions 
Ø The reference mission for the 1m diameter ETU is a 38 km/sec entry into Saturn at a -24o EFPA
Ø Stagnation point environments from Venus, Saturn and Earth entry missions
Comparison	of	Saturn,	Venus	and	Sample	Return	Flight	Environments	
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HEEET Development Status: 
Highlights from the Arc jet Test Campaigns
June	14,	2017 17
• Can HEEET be robust enough to be MSR EEV heat-shield? 
• How about MMOD performance?  
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Needed: Characterization of Local Features
Wedge	Test	Articles
CFD	Simulation	with	an	Assumed	Differential	Recession
A	single	piece	heat-shield	would	eliminate	the	complexity	due	to	seam	feature.		
Validated	modeling	of	seam	response	would	provide	broad	configuration	design	options.			
Needed: Characterization of MMOD Tolerance
§ MMOD impact tolerant design:
Ø Evaluate material behavior via testing  by MMOD testing followed by 
arc jet testing for hole growth 
Ø Shuttle Orbiter and Orion TPS followed this route 
Ø Physics-based impact and hole growth tools needed to assess the 
MMOD risk 
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From:  “Arcjet Testing of Micro-Meteoroid Impacted Thermal Protection Materials,”P. Agrawal, M. Munk and L.Glabb, 
AIAA Paper  2013-2903, presented at the 44th AIAA Thermosphysics Conference, June 24-27, San Diego, CA.
MSR - A Grand Challenge for the Nation 
MSR TPS - Grand Challenge for the Modeling Community
§ We need to be able to address:
Ø What features become flaws?  
Ø What flaws lead to failure?
• Char failure due to mechanical loads 
• Low density regions permitting interior flow 
• MMOD hole growth 
§ Testing alone is insufficient for establishing reliability
Ø Cannot test in fully-relevant environments
Ø Cannot perform number of tests needed for adequate failure statistics
§ Multi-scale, multi-dimensional models needed
Ø Must be validated against tests at range of partially-relevant environments
Ø Must address material response and failure physics for all failure modes
§ Mars Sample Return mission needs innovation in and application of 
new modeling capabilities
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Backup
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Outline 
§ Mars Sample Return Mission
Ø Mission Description
Ø Reliability Challenge
• Need to address all failure modes
§ State of the Art
Ø MSR Earth Entry Vehicle
Ø TPS Reliability
Ø TPS Modeling
§ What is Needed
Ø System Studies
• Reliability through redundancy and robustness
Ø TPS Capability Characterization
• Physics-based modeling validated against ground tests
• Features
• Thermo-structural Response
• Flaw to Failure Propagation
§ Concluding Remarks 
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Risk of TPS Failure
§ Risk is intentional interaction with uncertainty
Ø Load in new environment is uncertain
Ø System capability at time of loading is uncertain
• May be in degraded state
Ø NASA Policy on Mission Assurance [2] is to accept residual risk
• Remaining risk that exists after all mitigation actions have been implemented 
or exhausted in accordance with the risk management process
• As Safe As Reasonably Possible
§ System fails when it no longer performs its function
Ø TPS no longer protects structure and payload from over-temperature
Ø There is a (large) family of (thermal) load and (protection) capability curves for 
the TPS system
Load Capability
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Motivation
§ NASA’s missions are few and far between
Ø Investment in new materials and technology does not happen often
• 3- D Woven TPS / HEEET would not have been developed if 
Carbon Phenolic TPS were available.
§ Need an ablative TPS that can meet the Requirements for Mars 
Sample Return Mission in the next decade
Ø The Challenge is leveraging existing/emerging TPS, design a 
robust aero-shell and prove it can meet the requirements.
§ Ablation Modelling  
ØAdvances are focused on improving fundamental physics
• Flight TPS design presents challenges and opportunity
§ Future developments to address grand challenge of MSR TPS
8/30/17 24
